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Abstract 
This paper investigates the determinants of the maturity structure of Czech corporate 
debt. A theoretical section provides an overview of contemporary theories on corporate 
debt maturity structure. An empirical section describes an econometric model that shows 
that long-term debt increases with company size and leverage and asset maturity. The 
impact of growth options, collateralizable assets, corporate-tax rate, and company-level 
volatility proves statistically insignificant. Finally, the paper discusses the limitations of 
the results in terms of data, variables, and determinants. 
1.  Introduction 
If we consider decision-making in corporate finance, we can observe two main 
areas of interest. Besides the debt-versus-equity decision-making (where we can find 
extensive research in the area of capital structure) there is also the factor of debt matu-
rity, which is of the same importance but is usually not the focus of financial research. 
Surprisingly, there is rather little empirical evidence on determinants of the corporate 
debt maturity structure. One of the early papers is by Morris (1975), who focused on 
U.S. firms. Also, the other authors cover mainly U.S. firms (Mitchell, 1993), (Scherr, 
Hulburt, 2001), (Stohs, Mauer, 1996), (Barclay, Smith, 1995) or U.K. firms (Ooi, 1999), 
(Ozkan, 2002), (Ozkan, 2000) and there is also only a limited list of papers focused 
on cross-country comparison – see (Antoniou et al., 2003) and (Fan et al., 2003). We 
can also see that empirical evidence is more available in the case of market-based 
financial systems and more limited in the case of bank-based financial systems (see 
the cross-country comparison above or Cai et al., 1999). And since there is limited 
empirical evidence on the corporate debt maturity structure in the case of advanced 
economies, there is no empirical evidence for transition countries. This paper pre-
sents evidence for Czech firms, which can be seen as a good representative of 
the group of transition countries. 
Do we really know how financial practitioners decide on the financing tools 
of their firms? When and why do they choose bank debt, bond debt, or leasing? 
According to which terms do they decide on the maturity of these debts? And are 
the firms really the decision-makers on the financing tools, or are they only decision- 
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-takers forced to act by external factors (bank-based and market-based conditions, 
debtholders decisions)? Despite the huge theoretical and empirical research, not all of 
the above-mentioned questions can be satisfactorily answered. This paper aims to 
improve our knowledge on decision-making in corporate financing particularly in 
the case of Czech firms. Are the patterns of the corporate debt maturity structure of 
Czech firms similar to those in other developed countries or can we observe some 
deviations that might be the product of past dependency on the command economy? 
This paper tries to answer this question too. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of theories 
of debt maturity structure; Section 3 provides an econometric empirical analysis; 
Section 4 discusses limitations of the result and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2.  Theories of Debt Maturity Structure 
Before we can build up an empirical model for the determinants of the cor-
porate debt maturity structure, we need to deliver a survey of theoretical points of 
departure for our research. The literature offers several leading theories on debt 
maturity structure, namely Agency Costs, Leverage, Maturity Matching, Taxes, and 
Signaling.  
2.1  Agency Costs 
The first group of theories on the debt maturity structure regards agency 
costs as an important determinant of the debt maturity. We consider growth options, 
size, and collateralizable assets as the major ones.  
Growth Options 
The primary study on growth options is (Myers, 1977), who argues that cor-
porate future investment opportunities can be considered as options. The value of 
these growth options then depends on the probability that the firms will exercise 
them optimally. In the case of firms, profits from the investments are split among 
the shareholders and the debtholders accordingly. But in some cases the debtholders 
may capture too high a share of the profit, leaving below-normal returns to the share-
holders. This may create incentive problems for the shareholders since in this par-
ticular case the shareholders are keen to reject an investment with a positive net 
present value. Myers (1977) calls this situation an underinvestment problem. He 
further argues that the maturity of the debt can play an important role in resolving 
this issue. Firms can issue more short-term debt which matures and can be re- 
-contracted before the growth options can be exercised. “Thus it seems that permanent 
debt capital is best obtained by a policy of rolling over short-term maturity debt 
claims.” (Myers, 1977, p. 159) Similarly, Barnea et al. (1980) also argue for shortening 
the debt maturity, which can serve as a mitigation tool for the agency conflicts between 
the shareholder and the debtholders. “If the debt matures prior to the exercise of the in-
vestment option, the agency problem disappears.” (Barnea et al., 1980, p. 1233) 
Company Size 
It is widely accepted by the current literature that larger firms have lower 
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firms are believed to have easier access to capital markets (they can more easily 
overcome the transaction costs) and greater negotiation power (they have a stronger 
position in debt negotiation than smaller firms). Hence both these arguments favor 
larger firms for issuing more long-term debt compared to smaller firms. In addition 
to this, Smith and Warner (1979) argue that smaller firms are more likely to face 
higher agency costs in terms of conflict of interest between shareholders and debt-
holders. 
Collateralizable Assets 
The volume of collateralizable assets (e.g. assets such as inventory or pre-
mises that can be pledged in favor of the creditor) in the firm’s balance sheet is also 
believed to have an impact on the debt maturity structure (Whited, 1992). Firms with 
a higher share of collateralizable assets can pledge these assets in favor of the long- 
-term debtholders. This favors these firms in comparison to the firms with fewer 
collateralizable assets. The firms with fewer collateralizable assets are thus believed 
to have less long-term debt and more short-term debt. The impact of collateralizable 
assets is widely accepted, especially in terms of long-term debt discussions. Although 
short-term financing is to some degree provided on a bianco basis (with no colla-
teral), the bianco approach for long-term debts is very rare and collateral plays a very 
important role.  
Based on these agency costs arguments, we will consider the impact of 
growth options, size and collateralizable assets on the corporate debt maturity struc-
ture. 
2.2 Leverage
Leland and Toft (1996) theoretically show that firms with higher leverage 
tend to choose longer maturity of debt and vice versa. “Optimal leverage depends 
upon debt maturity, and is markedly lower when the firm is financed by shorter 
term debt.” (Leland, Toft, 1996, p. 1014) Morris (1992) also argues that firms with 
a higher debt ratio tend to issue more long-term debts in order to delay their exposure 
to bankruptcy risk. On the other hand, the tax and agency theories predict opposite 
effects of the leverage on debt maturity. Therefore the impact of the leverage on 
the debt maturity structure is an empirical puzzle.  
Based on these arguments, we will consider the impact of Leverage on cor-
porate debt maturity structure. 
2.3 Maturity Matching 
Maturity matching can be considered as liquidity immunization of the ba-
lance sheet structure. Stohs and Maurer (1996) and Morris (1976) argue that a firm 
can face the risk of not having sufficient cash in the case that the maturity of the debt 
is shorter than the maturity of the assets (the debt service is shorter than the asset life 
cycle, e.g. the ability to produce the cash flow) or even vice versa in the case that 
the maturity of the debt is longer than the maturity of assets (the cash flow from 
assets necessary for the debt repayment terminates). Following these arguments, 
the maturity matching principle belongs to the determinants of the corporate debt 
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Additionally, Myers (1977) argues that maturity matching of company 
assets and liabilities can also partially serve as a tool for mitigation of the under-
investment problem, which was discussed in the section on agency costs theory. Here 
the maturity matching principle ensures that the debt repayments shall be due ac-
cording to the decline of the asset value. “We can interpret matching maturities as 
an attempt to schedule debt repayments to correspond to the decline in the future 
value of assets currently in place.” (Myers, 1977, p. 171) 
Gapenski (1999) differentiates two strategies of maturity matching, namely 
the accounting and financing approaches. The accounting approach considers the assets 
as current and fixed and calls for the financing of the current assets with short-term 
liabilities, and of the fixed assets by long-term liabilities and equity. The financing 
approach considers the assets as permanent and temporary. In these terms the fixed 
assets are definitely permanent and some stable part of the fluctuating current assets 
is also taken as permanent. This approach then suggests financing the permanent 
assets with long-term funds (long-term liabilities and equity) and temporary assets 
with short-term liabilities. Consequently, the financing approach generally employs 
ceteris paribus more long-term liabilities than the accounting approach does. 
The financing approach (borrowing more on a long-term basis) brings more 
stable interest costs than the accounting approach; but as the yield curve is usually 
sloped upward, the financing approach is also more costly. The financing approach 
versus the accounting approach to decision-making is thus a classical risk return 
trade-off relationship. In practice, the companies commonly favor the accounting ap-
proach over the financing approach; the same holds for our consideration of maturity 
matching for the empirical evidence of the debt maturity structure. 
Based on these maturity matching arguments, we will consider the impact of 
balance sheet liquidity immunization on the corporate debt maturity structure. 
2.4 Taxes 
Kane et al. (1984) introduced a model that incorporated endogenous deter-
minants of the optimum corporate debt maturity: corporate and personal taxes, bank-
ruptcy costs and flotation costs (transaction costs of external financing). Their op-
timum debt maturity setting involves a trade-off between the advantage of a cor-
porate debt tax shield and the disadvantage of bankruptcy and flotation costs. They 
determined that the optimum debt maturity increases with:  
i) increasing flotation costs: “As expected, the higher the transaction costs as-
sociated with a debt issue, the grater the optimal maturity of the debt, since more time 
is required to amortize the flotation costs.” (Kane et al., 1984, p. 15) 
ii) decreasing corporate debt tax shield: “In addition, a high personal tax rate is ge-
nerally associated with higher optimal maturity. This is again due to the fact that at 
a lower tax advantage, a longer maturity is required to amortize the flotation costs incur-
red in issuing the debt. At very high personal tax rates, it becomes optimal for the firm to 
issue no debt because the tax advantage net of bankruptcy costs is never great enough to 
offset amortized transactions costs, whatever the maturity.” (Kane et al., 1984, p. 15) 
iii) decreasing volatility of the company value “reflecting the fact that with less 
volatile asset returns, the firm rebalances its capital structure less frequently”. (Kane 
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Based on these tax arguments, we will consider the impact of an effective 
corporate tax rate and company value volatility on the corporate debt maturity struc-
ture. We will omit the impact of flotation costs, as they are hard to be measured in 
our terms.  
In order to make the survey of theories on debt maturity structure as com-
prehensive as possible, we also deliver a list of debt maturity arguments whose im-
pact has not been investigated in this paper. 
2.5 Signaling 
Signaling Quality 
Signaling models predict that the corporate debt maturity structure is related 
to the degree of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders (investors). It 
is generally accepted that the corporate debt maturity structure can signal information 
about the quality of a firm. Flannery (1986) argues that the debt maturity can serve 
for more informed insiders as a signaling tool towards less informed outsiders. He 
further argues that low-quality firms (“bad firms” in his terminology) prefer more 
long-term debt and high-quality firms prefer more short-term debt. This is supported 
by the fact that in the transaction costs environment low-quality firms cannot afford 
to roll-over the short-term debt as they face a considerable risk of financial distress in 
the event that the debt is not prolonged. Flannery (1986) further argues that high- 
-quality firms (“good firms” in his words) will issue more short-term debt than low- 
-quality firms. The managers of high-quality firms voluntarily expose the firms to 
the risk of debt renegotiation after more information is available to the outsiders, as 
they expect this information to be positive. As a result, high-quality firms signal their 
type by issuing short-term debt. Consequently, the firms will wait with the debt issue 
if they expect that there will be good news, but they will not wait until bad news is 
released.
Due to the fact that the company quality is very difficult to be proxied, we 
retreat from the investigation of the above-mentioned signaling arguments on 
corporate debt maturity structure. 
Liquidity Risk or Creditworthiness Risk 
The liquidity risk or financial distress risk provides strong incentives for 
firms to borrow on a long-term basis. Diamond (1991) argues that short-term debt 
allows for renegotiation of debt costs after good news about the firm is released, 
which is in line with Flannery (1986) above. On the other hand, short-term debt re-
presents liquidity risk for the debtor, which would arise if the short-term debt is not 
renegotiated. Thus a typical trade-off relationship arises. Diamond (1991) further 
argues that low-quality debtors with low cash-flows for long-term debt repayments 
are forced to borrow on a short-term basis. Medium-quality debtors favor long-term 
financing since they face higher liquidity risk than the high-quality debtors. And 
high-quality debtors who face low liquidity risk favor short-term borrowing. In 
the end there are two types of short-term borrowers: those of high-quality and those 
of low-quality, whereas firms of medium-quality are expected to borrow on a long- 
-term basis. “Debt maturity choice is analyzed as a trade-off between a borrower’s 
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rating, and liquidity risk.” (Diamond, 1991, p. 709) However the predictions of the Dia-
mond model are not testable in the Czech environment. We lack the necessary com-
prehensive data, and therefore we retreat from the investigation of the above-men-
tioned creditworthiness arguments on corporate debt maturity structure. In addition to 
this, we surprisingly see that the arguments on signaling quality and signaling credit-
worthiness have produced different hypotheses for very similar determinants. Here 
the theory of corporate finance is to be streamlined in the future. 
Company Age 
Scherr and Hulburt (2001) also argue that age of a firm can be employed as 
a signaling tool. In these terms older firms are said to signal through their age that 
they are more stable than younger firms. Therefore older firms are expected to have 
a larger share of long-term debt than younger firms do. But, again, since we lack 
the necessary data, we retreat from the investigation of the above-mentioned com-
pany age arguments on corporate debt maturity structure. 
3.  Empirical Analysis 
At this time we have sufficiently evolved the theoretical arguments in order 
to be able to approach the empirical part. In this section we describe the sample of 
firms, provide the descriptive statistics for the sample, and then we compose the re-
gression equation, deliver the regression results, and compare these results with other 
empirical analyses. 
3.1 Sample of Firms 
Data was kindly provided by ýekia
1. These data included the financial state-
ments (the balance sheet and the profit and loss account) for all the firms in ýekia’s 
database for the years 2000–2004. The financial statements were provided with va-
rious detailed structures (in the full wording or in limited wording with subtotals) for 
firms of differing statuses (active, in bankruptcy, liquidation, etc.) from different sec-
tors (financial, manufacturing, services, etc.) for differing years (not all firms were 
covered for the whole time period). Naturally, this data set needed to be processed 
later to enable the empirical analysis. Generally, the data processing addressed two 
issues: the data structure (such as the firms covered) and the data (in)consistency 
(such as illogical data entries).  
First, the data structure was handled and the firms from inappropriate sectors 
(financial institutions), statuses (bankruptcy, liquidation), and legal statuses (municipali-
ties, private entrepreneurs, etc.) were omitted. Second, the data (in)consistency was 
handled as the data set included some illogical data entries, which needed to be adjusted. 
Therefore, the following data entries were omitted: firms with negative assets (for some 
reasons, these firms exist), firms with very little detailed structure of financial statements 
(determinants of the debt maturity structure could not be computed), years with double 
data entries (some firms were reported more than once for a particular year, mainly with 
differing detailed structures of financial statements), firms of unknown business sector, 
and some other inconsistent data entries. 
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This data set was further employed for the econometric analysis, which was 
computed in TSP software 
3.2  Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the dependant and explanatory 
variables. The data set employed for the empirical evidence included the balanced 
panel data of 793 firms; each firm was provided with financial statements for 5 years 
(2000–2004), resulting in 3,965 data entries in total. 
Table 2 reports the correlations matrix for the dependant and explanatory 
variables. The correlations are generally in line with the expectations of the regres-
sion model. The coefficients of correlation of explanatory variables are generally 
low. However, there are some exceptions of stronger correlations. First, growth op-
tions strongly positively correlate with collateralizable assets. Since tangible fixed 
assets are largely depreciated (only land is not depreciated) and also as there are few 
assets other than tangible fixed assets (such as software) that are depreciated, 
the  volume of depreciation is highly dependent on the volume of tangible fixed 
assets. Therefore these two explanatory variables correlate strongly. Second, growth 
TABLE 1  Descriptive Statistics for Dependant and Explanatory Variables 
Descriptive statistics  Valid N  Mean  Std. dev. 
Debt maturity structure  3 965   0.35  0.4407 
Growth options  3 965   0.05  0.1858 
Company size  3 965   7.90  5.6554 
Collateralizable assets  3 965   0.43  1.5038 
Leverage  3 965   0.09  0.2011 
Asset maturity  3 965  -0.04  0.4805 
Corporate-tax rate  3 965   0.15  3.9974 
Company-level volatility  3 965  6 987  328 820 


























Growth options  1 0.038   0.976   0.583  -0.466  0.001  -0.001  0.048 
Company size   0.038  1  0.042   0.287   0.051  0.038   0.034  0.142 
Collateralizable 
assets   0.976  0.042  1  0.598  -0.447  0.003   0.002  0.074 
Leverage   0.583  0.287   0.598  1 -0.007  0.009   0.029  0.275 
Asset maturity  -0.466  0.051  -0.447  -0.007  1 0.007   0.018  0.164 
Corporate-tax rate  0.001  0.038   0.003   0.009   0.007  1  0.001  0.005 
Company-level 
volatility  -0.001  0.034   0.002   0.029   0.018  0.001  1 0.008 
Debt maturity 
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options also positively correlate with leverage. This might be due to the fact that in-
debted firms have a higher share of depreciated assets (mainly tangible fixed assets) 
and vice versa. Third, growth options further negatively correlate with asset maturity. 
Here the intuitive explanation does not seem to be at hand, as the asset maturity is 
computed as an interaction of both fixed assets and equity levels. Fourth, colla-
teralizable assets positively correlate with leverage, which is similar to the corre-
lation of growth options and leverage. It might be the case that firms with a higher 
share of tangible assets are more heavily indebted and vice versa. Fifth, colla-
teralizable assets are also negatively correlated with asset maturity. Again, as in 
the case of the correlation of growth options and asset maturity, the explanation is not 
straightforward. The only simple explanation would be that firms with tangible assets 
tend to have an excess of equity over fixed assets (and thus less need of long-term 
funds). 
3.3  Test of Data Set on Macroeconomic Environment 
Table 3 provides a comparison of the ýekia data set used for our empirical 
analysis with a data set from the Czech Statistical Office (CZSO) as representative 
of the general macroeconomic environment. Both portfolios are divided into indus-
tries according to NACE. However the CZSO portfolio includes only firms having 
more than 100 employees, whereas the ýekia portfolio does not differentiate ac-
cording to the number of employees. Here a small differentiation arises but this is 
still fully acceptable for the first approximation of the test of our data set with the ge-
neral macroeconomic environment. In general, the difference in the portfolios of 
firms of ýekia and CZSO is not strong. The ýekia data set includes fewer manu-
facturing firms that are outweighed by more utilities and trading firms (wholesale, 
retail and others). This indicates that our data set is not to be biased from the ge-
neral macro-economic environment and the regression results can be considered as 
plausible. 
3.4 Regression Equation 
Based on the arguments in the section on theories of debt maturity structure 
and in the section on proxies for debt maturity structure determinants, the regression 
equation can be written in a following form: 
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where D1 is debt maturing over one year, TD is total debt, Į is the intercept, ȕ1 are 
the unknown parameters of interest, D is annual depreciation, TA is total assets, S is 
annual sales, TanFA is tangible fixed assets, TA is total assets, FA is fixed assets, Eq
is equity, T is tax expense, PTI is pre-tax income, EBITDA is earnings before interest, 
taxes, depreciation and amortization, t is the time period, İi stands for the error term; 
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where DMS is the debt maturity structure. 
The major literature on the corporate debt maturity structure uses pooled OLS. 
In Ooi (1999) the significance of these pooled OLS results is at least not worse than 
that of other methods. However this method is known that it does not fully consider 
the firm-specific effect in case of the panel data analysis. If such firm-specific effects 
are present (and we do believe that they are), the pooled OLS results are not efficient. 
In such cases, one-way error component models (fixed effects or random effects) are 
TABLE 3  Data Sets of CZSO and ýekia 
NACE  Industry name  Czech Statistical 
Office  ýekia
A Agriculture, hunting, forestry       7,7 %       5,3 % 
01 Agriculture, hunting, forestry and related 
activities  6,8 %  4,4 % 
02 Forestry and related activities      1,0 %  0,9 % 
B Fishing       0,1 %       0,3 % 
C Mining      0,9 %       1,4 % 
D Manufacturing     55,2 %     38,1 % 
DA Manufacture of food, drink and tobacco 
products  7,0 %  5,5 % 
DB Manufacture of textile and textile products  3,9 %  2,5 % 
DC Manufacture of leather and leather products  0,7 %  0,0 % 
DD Manufacture of wood products except for 
furniture  1,5 %  0,8 % 
DE Manufacture of pulp and paper  2,3 %  1,5 % 
DF Manufacture of oil and oil products  0,1 %  0,4 % 
DG Manufacture of chemical and pharmaceutical 
products  1,9 %  2,8 % 
DH Manufacture of rubber and rubber products  3,6 %  1,8 % 
DI Manufacture of other non-metal mineral 
products  3,6 %  3,7 % 
DJ  Manufacture of basic metals and metal products 8,4 %  4,9 % 
DK Manufacture of machineries  8,1 %  5,8 % 
DL  Manufacture of electrical and optical devices  7,1 %  2,9 % 
DM Manufacture of transportation vehicles  4,0 %  4,0 % 
DN Manufacture of other products  3,1 %  1,5 % 
E Utilities       2,7 %      10,6 % 
F Construction       6,7 %        7,9 % 
G Wholesale, retail and repair of conveyance and 
products for personal use     10,5 %      17,3 % 
H Accommodation       1,8 %        0,5 % 
I Transportation       5,1 %        5,4 % 
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to be utilized in order to implicitly consider the firm-specific effects. Here, Baltagi 
(2001, p. 65) suggests the Hausman’s specification test for the decision-making me-
chanism between the fixed effects model and the random effects model. Based on 
this test (with p  <  0,001) the fixed effects model was indicated as the more 
appropriate one. However, even the fixed effects method is not without limitations. 
This is mainly in the case when correlation of disturbances with explanatory va-
riables is not due to a firm-specific effect and some explanatory variables are en-
dogenous. Since the IV method also some has drawbacks (see (Antoniou et al, 
2003)), the fixed effects method is widely deemed sufficiently appropriate (see 
(Stohs, Mauer, 1996), (Heyman et al, 2003), (Barclay, Smith, 1995)). 
3.5  Regression Results 
Table 4 reports the regression results for model one and model two. We list 
the results for the two models separately; for both models we provide fixed effects 
and pooled OLS results. However, as we already mentioned, the fixed effects model 
is to be considered as appropriate for our data. Therefore the commentary of results 
shall mention only fixed effects and pooled OLS remains for informational purposes 
only. Model one includes a full list of explanatory variables listed in the hypotheses 
section to be considered. Model two does not include the corporate tax rate and com-
pany level volatility variables that were not deemed statistically significant in model 
one for both fixed effects and pooled OLS. 
The major explanatory variables have been found to be significant and more 
importantly also in line with the theoretical predictions (which are noted as an ex-
pected sign in the table). Company size has been found to have a statistically sig-
TABLE 4  Regression Results 
Model One  Model Two 
Explanatory variables  Expected 
sign  Fixed effects Pooled OLS 
model  Fixed effects Pooled OLS 
model 
Growth options  - -0,175  -0,617  -0,175  -0,617 
(-0,87)  (-3,51)**  (-0,87)  (-3,51)** 
Company size  + 0,037  0,012  0,036  0,012 
(2,23)*  (3,03)**  (2,21)*  (-3,03)** 
Collateralizable assets  + -0,648  0,039  -0,680  0,039 
(-0,04)  (2,67)**  (-0,04)  (-2,67)** 
Leverage  + 0,425  0,066  0,424  0,655 
(8,49)**  (14,46)**  (-8,46)**  (-14,46)** 
Asset maturity  + 0,538  0,124  0,053  0,124 
(2,32)*  (7,29)**  (-2,29)*  (7,29)** 
Corporate-tax rate  - -0,110  0,049 
(-0,86)  (-0,03) 
Company-level volatility  - -0,213  -0,617 
(-1,38)  (-0,31) 
Number of observations  3 965  3 965  3 965  3 965 
Adjusted R
2 0,6624  0,10989  0,6621  0,10986 
Note: ** significant at the 1% level, * significant at the 5% level; t-statistics in parenthesis 152                                        Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 3-4 
nificant positive impact on the corporate debt maturity structure. Larger firms tend to 
have more long-term debt since they are said to have lower agency costs, better ac-
cess to debtholders and stronger negotiation power. Leverage has been found to have 
a statistically significant positive impact on the corporate debt maturity structure. Firms 
that are more indebted tend to have more long-term debt and less indebted firms tend 
to have less long-term debt, which is a very intuitive result. Asset maturity has been 
found to have a statistically significant positive impact on the corporate debt maturity 
structure. The firms have been found to conduct the maturity matching of their 
balance sheets following the simple rule that fixed assets need to be funded by long- 
-term funds (i.e., by equity or by long-term debt). However, the remaining expla-
natory variables, namely growth options, collateralizable assets, corporate tax rate 
and company level volatility have not been found to have any statistically significant 
impact on the debt maturity structure. Growth options and collateralizable assets 
have been found to be statistically significant in pooled OLS computation, though 
this was not the case for the fixed effects approach. 
It is necessary to mention, that these presented results are not only fully in line 
with the theoretical expectations, but that they are also in line with other empirics (see 
below). But most importantly, they are in line with the intuitive expectations of finance 
practitioners. Despite the fact that there is no thorough analysis of financial managers’ 
opinions, they would probably name company leverage, company size, the company’s 
collateral and asset maturity as the major driving forces of corporate debt maturity 
structure decision-making. Nevertheless Company’s collateral has been found as sta-
tistically significant for pooled OLS only and not for fixed effects. 
3.6  Comparative Analysis 
Table 5 reports the comparison of selected empirical analyses on the corpo-
rate debt maturity structure. The results of our analysis are fully in line with the re-
sults of other papers. A full consensus has been found in the case of the leverage and 
asset maturity explanatory variables. Some consensus has been found in the case of 
the company size, creditworthiness, company age, liquidity, company level volatility, 
interest rate term structure and interest rate volatility explanatory variables. Whereas 
for the remaining explanatory variables – growth options, collateralizable assets, 
company quality and corporate tax rate – no consensus has been found. It seems ne-
cessary to mention, that the presented papers employed to some extent varying 
proxies for particular variables (both dependant and explanatory). However, this va-
riation does not jeopardize the comparability of the findings. For a more detailed 
discussion, please see (Körner, 2006).  
As the empirical findings for Czech firms are generally in line with findings 
of other empirical analysis papers, which were generally focused on standard ad-
vanced economies such as Germany, the UK and the United States, we can state that 
firms in transition economies seem to have a similar pattern in the debt maturity 
structure decision-making to that of firms in standard economies. 
4.  Limitations 
Naturally, there are several areas of limitations of the presented empirical 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.154                                   Finance a úvČr - Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 57, 2007, no. 3-4 
ly the limited explanatory power of the data, the limited explanatory power of the va-
riables, and the limited explanatory power of the determinants. 
4.1 Data Limitations 
We need to be aware of the fact that the data employed for the empirical 
analysis (mainly financial ratios) have some limitations in the evidence they provide. 
These mainly stem from the fact they are fully based on the accounting data. First, 
the majority of the financial statements are going through the process of window- 
-dressing in order to look better for shareholders and debtholders or in order to look 
worse for the tax authorities (depending on which incentive prevails). The discussion 
of this issue with an endless list of names such as window-dressing, book-cooking or 
creative accounting is not the subject of this paper. For us it is fully sufficient to state 
that financial statements can be “cooked” in all items (assets, liabilities, revenues and 
costs) in all directions (changing statement structure, increasing or decreasing some 
items or even swapping B/S and off-B/S status
2) and that this all can be done using 
both legal and illegal tools.  
Second, these collected data (still having in mind the bookkeeping limita-
tions, the data structure, and data inconsistency adjustments mentioned in the data 
description paragraph) still report some drawbacks. Surprisingly, the data do not fully 
meet the ex-ante expected range. There are firms with negative assets, negative 
equity or even negative liabilities. These are states that should not be possible ex- 
-definitione, but which are present and of which explanation is fairly simple (some 
firms book receivables as negative liabilities; some firms do not proceed according to 
bankruptcy law if they have negative equity, etc.). 
To sum up the data limitations, although the accounting entries are called 
hard data, we know that they need to be interpreted with some degree of freedom. 
But despite all these facts (the majority of them shall be understood as data draw-
backs), we must be aware of the fact that these data are the best available and there-
fore bring some added value.  
Until now we have discussed the limitations of the information that was 
included in the data. But we are also facing some limitations which stem from the fact 
that our data do not include some useful information. First, and most importantly, we 
lack information on market values. As the Czech corporate governance system is 
based on bank financing, the Czech capital market is very limited and therefore only 
a very limited amount of firms can report the market values for their equities. Thus 
we cannot investigate the impacts of the market value data on the debt maturity 
structure, which is usually employed for economies with a market based financing 
corporate governance system. This is especially missing in case of growth options 
assessments.  
Second, we lack information on credit ratings. Some studies on the debt 
maturity structure also employ credit ratings (Stohs and Mauer, 1996) or some de-
fault measures (Scherr, Hulburt, 2001), (Heyman et al., 2003) as proxies for the cor-
porate quality as one of the determinants of the corporate debt maturity structure. But 
2 B/S is balance-sheet status, e.g. items booked on the balance sheet; off-B/S is off-balance-sheet status, 
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in the Czech environment only a very limited number of firms can report a credit 
rating of international rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor or Fitch). Some of 
the firms can report credit ratings of local rating agencies (CRA
3), but the majority of 
the reported firms remain unrated. Therefore we were not able to proxy the company 
quality by credit ratings, but the utilization of a default measure for the Czech evi-
dence might be a subject of future research. 
Third, we lack flotation costs data, which is a very common fact for all eco-
nomies as the transaction costs of a debt are very hard to assess. This would be useful 
information for purposes tackled in the tax hypothesis paragraph, but once again, as 
none of the empirical analyses on the corporate debt maturity structure includes this 
proxy, this paper is not relatively worse in these terms. 
Fourth, we lack the age of the companies. Naturally, the Czech Commercial 
Register provides this type of information. But the nature of our data set where 
the firm names were not disclosed made it impossible to match the ýekia data and 
the data from the Czech Commercial Register in order to ascertain the given com-
pany’s age. This determinant would definitely be interesting to investigate. How-
ever, as the company’s age is not very often utilized in the debt maturity structure 
investigations, this paper is again not relatively worse in these terms. 
4.2  Variables Limitations 
But not only the data as such have limitations. We employ these data for 
computations of variables, which serve as proxies for the determinants of the cor-
porate debt maturity structure. As was discussed in the empirical analysis section, 
setting the formula for a variable that shall serve as a proxy for a particular deter-
minant is not always a simple issue. First, some determinants do not have a very 
explicit name. One can imagine growth options, company quality, creditworthiness 
or company level volatility in very differing states, and thus sometimes the first task 
stems from the interpretation of the determinant name. Thus the variable formulas 
naturally differ across the empirical analysis papers even though there is a main 
stream of proxies created by papers inspired by each other. Second, even if there is 
a general consensus with the determinant name interpretation such as collateralizable 
assets, we face differing formulas for the variables stemming from differing opinions 
on the items that should or should not be included in the formula. Third, in some 
cases we can be provided with equally good proxies for one determinant as it seems 
to be the case for company size and we need to employ some decision-making me-
chanism in choosing the more appropriate one. And last but not least, we have some 
variables which might be employed as proxies for differing determinants. Here should 
be mentioned at least the complementarity of formulas proxying the signaling quality 
and liquidity risk theories (for the relevant literature, see Table 5), even though these 
have not been investigated in this paper. 
4.3 Determinants Limitations 
And finally, there are some limitations of determinants as such, namely in 
terms of the determinants coverage. In our analysis we employed those determinants 
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that were found crucial by theoretical papers, those that were already utilized in em-
pirical papers, and also those where the Czech data necessary for the computations 
are available. Due to the third reason, we needed to omit creditworthiness and com-
pany age, the impact of which would definitely be interesting to assess. But we also 
face some other determinants that have not been utilized in empirical papers yet. 
First, no determinant takes into account some sort of cash flow. And as we know that 
“cash is king” (McKinsey, 2005), the corporate debt maturity structure is expected to 
also be affected by the fact of whether a firm is cash rich or cash poor. In this regard, 
the proxies based on the EBITDA are to some extent close to the determinant of cash 
flow, but one could imagine more a precise proxy for such missing determinant. 
Second, we are also missing an instrument that would incorporate the off-B/S items 
important for the corporate debt maturity structure assessments. Leasing is the most 
important one. Despite some tax impact motivations there are mainly motivations in 
making the firm less indebted on the on-B/S level that drives the utilization of leas-
ing. And since leasing as a sort of long-term debt is not included in our computations, 
this makes our on-B/S long-term debt undervalued.  
And there is one more thing that we are missing. The determinants of the cor-
porate debt maturity structure are employed equally in the empirical analysis. But 
there is no reason to believe that in reality they have the same importance. It would 
be interesting to investigate which determinant is more important than the other one, 
when this is the case, and why. As this is not possible to achieve using our model, 
this might be a subject of future research. 
To sum up this section, we have data that do not fully represent the variable 
formulas; we have variables (or proxies) that do not fully represent the determinants; 
and we have determinants that need not necessarily be the important ones for 
the  corporate debt maturity structure. But despite all this, the results are strong 
enough to improve our knowledge of the true behavior of firms in debt maturity 
decision-making. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper was assembled in search of the determinants of the corporate 
debt maturity structure of Czech firms. In the theoretical section it has brought an over-
view of the points of departure for choosing the proper and important determinants 
for the corporate debt maturity structure. In the regression section it has shown that 
long-term debt increases with company size, leverage and asset maturity. The impact 
of growth options, collateralizable assets, corporate tax rate, and company level vo-
latility has been deemed statistically insignificant. It was further shown that these 
results are generally in line with other papers on this topic covering other economies. 
Finally, the paper discussed the limitations of the results in the data, variables, and 
determinants field.  
Since the empirical evidence for the debt maturity structure is limited for 
advanced economies and very rare for transition economies, this paper provides some 
valuable insights. It has shown that Czech firms, as representatives of transition eco-
nomies, follow a similar pattern in the setting of the maturity of debt as in the case of 
standard advanced economies. This also implies that the behavior of Czech financial 
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Our results are fully in line with the empirical evidence of debt maturity 
from differing financial systems, whether bank-based or capital market-based ones. 
This can lead to the conclusion that the nature of the financial system does note de-
termine the companies’ debt maturity choice. Moreover it seems that the debt matu-
rity choice is determined by internal features of the company, namely size, the neces-
sity to match the maturity of assets and liabilities and total indebtedness.  
The extension of the future research should be channeled toward the fields 
mentioned in the chapter on the limitations of the results. Three major issues are to 
be incorporated into the determinants. First, creditworthiness in terms of credit ra-
tings from external agencies might bring valuable insights into how the financial 
standing affects the debt-maturity choices. Second, off-B/S items (and most im-
portantly leasing) also serve as important sources of financing. Taking these into ac-
count would provide a broader picture of corporate debt maturity. Third, being aware 
of the fact that cash is king, including some sort of cash flow determinant among 
the explanatory variables, might bring additional knowledge of how the cash position 
affects the debt maturity structure of a corporate entity. 
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